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PROBLEMATIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AI AND HEALTH PRIVACY
W. Nicholson Price II*
The interaction of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and health privacy is a two-way
street. Both directions are problematic. This Article makes two main points. First,
the advent of artificial intelligence weakens the legal protections for health privacy
by rendering deidentification less reliable and by inferring health information from
unprotected data sources. Second, the legal rules that protect health privacy
nonetheless detrimentally impact the development of AI used in the health system
by introducing multiple sources of bias: collection and sharing of data by a small set
of entities, the process of data collection while following privacy rules, and the use
of non-health data to infer health information. The result is an unfortunate antisynergy: privacy protections are weak and illusory, but rules meant to protect
privacy hinder other socially valuable goals. This state of affairs creates biases in
health AI, privileges commercial research over academic research, and is ill-suited
to either improve health care or protect patients’ privacy. The ongoing dysfunction
calls for a new bargain between patients and the health system about the uses of
patient data.
I. IMPACT OF AI ON MEDICAL PRIVACY
Consider first the impact of artificial intelligence on medical privacy. The
advent of artificial intelligence—alongside the big data with which it is trained and
on which it operates—weakens mechanisms used to protect medical data privacy in
at least two ways. First, AI enables actors with big data and sufficient computing
capacity to work around deidentification, a key front-line protection for patient
health data. Second, by enabling accurate and sophisticated inferences about health
information from large sets of data that are not obviously tied to health, AI reduces
the efficacy of trying to protect (or even identify what counts as) “health data.”
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A. Deidentification and Reidentification
Deidentification is a common tool used to protect medical privacy. The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)1 Privacy Rule is the
dominant legal rule governing health data privacy2 and likely the single most potent
federal privacy regime in the United States. The HIPAA Privacy Rule only governs
identifiable health information and includes a safe harbor under which information
that has been stripped of 18 listed identifiers is defined as not identifiable.3 What
does that mean? Information custodians can remove those identifiers from health
data and stop worrying about HIPAA (at least with respect to those data).
Deidentification is a popular intervention outside the United States as well; the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, for instance, does not cover
anonymized data.4
Artificial intelligence reduces the already-weak power of deidentification5 to
protect health privacy by making it easier to reidentify patients, either individually
or at scale.6 AI enables reidentification by finding patterns in data. Perhaps most
1

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936.
2
45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019); The HIPAA Privacy Rule is not the only health privacy
law in the United States, of course; state laws may have more restrictive provisions on
specific topics or in general, and other federal laws govern subsets of health privacy, such as
genetic information. But HIPAA cuts across state lines and structures much of the discussion
surrounding health data privacy.
3
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2019).
4
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 26, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 [https://perma.cc/QYF8-WGX3]. Note
that the GDPR anonymity standard requires that deidentification be so complete that
reidentification is impossible—a standard which the rest of this Section suggests may be nigh
impossible. See Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination,
Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87, 105
(2018) (noting that the anonymization standard renders many data effectively unusable).
5
See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716–26 (2010) (noting ways to
reidentify data); Yaniv Erlich & Arvind Narayanan, Routes for Breaching and Protecting
Genetic Privacy, 15 NATURE REV. GENETICS 409, 409–16 (2014) (cataloging ways to
reidentify genetic data).
6
One rebuttal is that AI reidentification is likely to be probabilistic rather than
deterministic—that is, while an AI system may think it highly likely that a particular set of
data belongs to a particular person, it cannot state that fact with certainty. This seems true
but irrelevant, given the inherently probabilistic nature of most data. Cf. Luc Rocher, Julien
M. Hendrickx & Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Estimating the Success of Re-identifications
in Incomplete Datasets Using Generative Models, 10 NATURE COMMC’NS 3069 (2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-10933-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ASB-L2DX]
(noting the probabilistic nature of reidentification attacks).
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dramatically, researchers have used AI to reidentify a substantial majority of patients
from deidentified datasets of physical activity data collected from wearable fitness
trackers.7 AI can also help link deidentified health records with other datasets that
include identified information, such as internet searches or other consumer records.8
But AI has now appeared on both sides of the health data privacy arms race.
Just as AI can be used to decrease the privacy of anonymized datasets, AI can be
used to increase privacy. AI can deidentify records that are otherwise costly to
deidentify, such as textual notes from medical encounters.9 It can also create fully
or partially synthetic datasets—that is, datasets that reflect real data patterns but in
which no actual data are real.10 It’s a challenging exercise because for the data to be
useful, the patterns must reflect the underlying population, but it’s not always easy
to know beforehand what patterns are going to be important; simpler patterns are
easier to preserve than more complex ones.11

7

Liangyuan Na, Cong Yang, Chi-Cheng Lo, Fangyuan Zhao, Yoshimi Fukuoka & Anil
Aswani, Feasibility of Reidentifying Individuals in Large National Physical Activity Data
Sets from Which Protected Health Information Has Been Removed with Use of Machine
Learning, 1 JAMA NETWORK OPEN e186040 (Dec. 21, 2018), https://jamanetwork.com/
journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2719130 [https://perma.cc/HXF7-9766].
8
See W. Nicholson Price II, Margot E. Kaminski, Timo Minssen & Kayte SpectorBagdady, Shadow Health Records Meet New Data Privacy Laws, 363 SCIENCE 448, 448–49
(2019).
9
Amber Stubbs, Christopher Kotfila & Özlem Uzuner, Automated Systems for the Deidentification of Longitudinal Clinical Narratives: Overview of 2014 i2b2/UTHealth Shared
Task Track 1, 58 J. BIOMED. INFORMATICS S11, S11 (2015).
10
See Edward Choi, Siddharth Biswal, Bradley Malin, Jon Duke, Walter F. Stewart &
Jimeng Sun, Generating Multi-Label Discrete Patient Records Using Generative
Adversarial Networks, 68 PROC. MACH. LEARNING HEALTHCARE 286 (2017),
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v68/choi17a/choi17a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3CH6-AST7]
(describing using machine learning to create synthetic datasets); Alexander Watson, Deep
Dive on Generating Synthetic Data for Healthcare, MEDIUM (May 12, 2020),
https://medium.com/gretel-ai/deep-dive-on-generating-synthetic-data-for-healthcare-41acb
4078707 [https://perma.cc/RCS6-3MYN] (describing Gretel, a software product for creating
synthetic data using machine learning).
11
Anat Reiner Benaim, Ronit Almog, Yuri Gorelik, Irit Hochberg, Laila Nassar, Tanya
Mashiach, Mogher Khamaisi, Yael Lurie, Zaher S. Azzam, Johad Khoury, Daniel Kurnik &
Rafael Beyar, Analyzing Medical Research Results Based on Synthetic Data and Their
Relation to Real Data Results: Systematic Comparison from Five Observational Studies, 8
JMIR MED. INFORMATICS e16492 (2020); Debbie Rankin, Michaela Black, Raymond Bond,
Jonathan Wallace, Maurice Mulvenna & Gorka Epelde, Reliability of Supervised Machine
Learning Using Synthetic Data in Health Care: Model to Preserve Privacy for Data Sharing,
8 JMIR MED. INFORMATICS e18910 (2020).
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Of course, when one side pulls ahead in an arms race, the other tries harder12—
and new AI systems are being developed that can, remarkably enough, extract some
identifiable data from purely synthetic datasets.13 That is, even if no people—no
data!—in a synthetic dataset are real, some systems can still glean information about
identifiable people from whose data the synthetic dataset was initially created.14 To
be sure, the risk of privacy loss is still much lower with synthetic datasets (at least,
for now).15
B. Health Inferences
AI can further intrude upon patient privacy by inferring sensitive information
about patients, even if that information is never directly shared with anyone. The
now-classic example is of Target inferring pregnancy from shopping habits;16 Anya
Prince also persuasively explains how a wealth of health information can be inferred
from location data.17 This pattern—the combination of medical big data and AI
enabling the inference of sensitive health data without ever actually accessing
sensitive health data—is constantly growing more powerful. As Jeff Skopek puts it,
“[The Target] example will soon seem quaint, however, as machine-learning
algorithms infer significantly more complex personal traits from seemingly
irrelevant data collected across disparate domains of life.”18 Skopek argues that such
inferences are not violations of privacy rights as the law understands them,19 but to
the extent that patients, physicians, or others view the acquisition of knowledge
about a patient’s personal health as sounding in something like privacy, AI
nevertheless impacts—and decreases—the strength of that privacy.
12
See James Jordon, Daniel Jarrett, Jinsung Yoon, Paul Elbers, Patrick Thoral, Ari
Ercole, Cheng Zhang, Danielle Belgrave & Mihaela van der Schaar, Hide-and-Seek Privacy
Challenge: Synthetic Data Generation vs. Patient Re-identification with Clinical Time-Series
Data (June 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.vanderschaar-lab.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/HASPC_overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FMF-AKTQ]
(describing a literal competition between those generating synthetic datasets based on
clinical time-series data and those seeking to reidentify patients based on the synthetic
datasets).
13
Khaled El Emam, Lusy Mosquera & Jason Bass, Evaluating Identity Disclosure Risk
in Fully Synthetic Health Data: Model Development and Validation, 22 J. MED. INTERNET
RSCH. e23139 (2020), https://www.jmir.org/2020/11/e23139/ [https://perma.cc/3NPBEPZZ].
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework
to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 94–95 (2014).
17
Anya E.R. Prince, Location as Health, 21 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y (forthcoming
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767122 [https://perma.cc/2GV
G-GTQN].
18
Jeffrey M. Skopek, Untangling Privacy: Losses Versus Violations, 105 IOWA L. REV.
2169, 2223 (2020).
19
Id. at 2223–30.
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To make the point broader, protections for health data, HIPAA in particular,
take as a given the idea that there is a meaningful category of “health data.” Big data
and AI show us that “health data” is a nebulous category, and the category of “data
that can reveal things about health” contains a much broader set of information.20
Thus, to the extent that law tries to specially protect health data through privacy
regimes, those regimes are likely to be less effective as AI becomes more powerful
and more prevalent.
II. IMPACT OF MEDICAL PRIVACY ON AI
In an unfortunate irony, even though AI decreases the strength of health
privacy, the rules surrounding health privacy also cause problems for the
development of AI used for health and patient care. The use of AI in the health
system is rapidly increasing.21 The Food and Drug Administration has cleared
hundreds of AI-powered products for marketing,22 and many more are being
developed and used in-house by hospitals, health systems, and insurers.23 AI systems
are used to diagnose diabetic retinopathy,24 to identify the risk of brain hemorrhage
from CT scans,25 and to predict the likelihood of patient complications or hospital
readmissions,26 among many other possibilities. But this development faces
20

W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in the Age of Medical Big Data, 25
NATURE MED. 37, 39 (2019).
21
Joachim Roski, Booz Allen Hamilton, Wendy Chapman, Jaimee Heffner, Fred
Hutchinson, Ranak Trivedi, Guilherme Del Fiol, Rita Kukafka, Paul Bleicher, Hossein Estiri,
Jeffrey Klann & Joni Pierce, How Artificial Intelligence Is Changing Health and Health
Care, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTH CARE: THE HOPE, THE HYPE, THE PROMISE,
THE PERIL 59–79 (Michael Matheny, Sonoo Thadeny Israni, Mahnoor Ahmed & Danielle
Whicher
eds.,
2019),
https://nam.edu/artificial-intelligence-special-publication/
[https://perma.cc/D2E9-KLBL].
22
Casey Ross, Explore STAT’s Database of FDA-Cleared AI Tools, STAT (Feb. 3,
2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/03/fda-artificial-intelligence-clearance-products/
[https://perma.cc/EXM4-NXVD].
23
W. Nicholson Price II, Rachel E. Sachs & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, New Innovation
Models in Medical AI, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4–5) (on file
with authors), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783879 [https://perma.cc/Q963-PKUX].
24
History of Digital Diagnostics, DIGIT. DIAGNOSTICS, http://digitaldx.wpengine.com/
about/history/ [https://perma.cc/DXB3-BM3V] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (describing the
IDx-DR system).
25
See Mohammad R. Arbabshirani, Brandon K. Fornwalt, Gino J. Mongelluzzo,
Jonathan D. Suever, Brandon D. Geise, Aalpen A. Patel & Gregory J. Moore, Advanced
Machine Learning in Action: Identification of Intracranial Hemorrhage on Computed
Tomography Scans of the Head with Clinical Workflow Integration, 1 NPJ DIGIT. MED. 9
(2018) (demonstrating a positive impact from applying machine learning to workflow
optimization in radiology based on automated CT analyses).
26
See, e.g., Ben J. Marafino, Alejandro Schuler, Vincent X. Liu, Gabriel J. Escobar &
Mike Baiocchi, Predicting Preventable Hospital Readmissions with Causal Machine
Learning, 55 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 993, 993 (2020) (suggesting that machine learning can
be used to identify preventable hospital readmissions).
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substantial hurdles in terms of privacy rules around health data (closely paralleled
by requirements for informed consent in some contexts). For now, I’ll set aside
whether those hurdles are justified and focus instead on their effects. Principally,
privacy protections around health data AI make it more challenging to collect
datasets, and in particular make it harder to collect broad, representative, diverse
datasets.27 This results in datasets, and health AI, that reflect and encode problematic
biases.
A. Privacy Hurdles for Health AI Development
AI needs to be trained with large amounts of data, whether patient medical
records, pharmacy data, insurance claims information, or other health-related data.
And therein lies the challenge: the privacy protections for health data, though
vulnerable in the ways accounted for above, still raise substantial hurdles for the use
of health data to train AI. Dealing with those hurdles raises its own challenges for
health AI.
Take HIPAA. The HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits most health-care providers,
health insurers, and health information clearinghouses (collectively, “covered
entities”) and their business associates from using or disclosing identifiable health
information28 absent any of several specified exceptions, including the authorization
of the patient or use for quality improvement—but not for research aimed at
developing generalizable knowledge.29 If a hospital wishes to share patient
information useful to develop, for instance, a predictor of the risk of stroke, it must
typically either obtain limited-duration individual patient authorization (and
consent) to share the information or deidentify the patient data. The first approach
is costly, because obtaining patient authorization and meaningfully informed
consent30 takes time.31 The second approach, deidentifying, can remove information
27

See generally Charlotte A. Tschider, AI’s Legitimate Interest: Towards a Public
Benefit Privacy Model, 21 HOUST. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3725933 [https://perma.cc/WYW44W2Z] (describing this tension).
28
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 160.502 (2019).
29
Id. § 160.501.
30
See generally Charlotte A. Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for
Patients of the Future, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1505 (2019) (identifying the difficulties of
obtaining meaningful consent).
31
Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific
Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 123 (2012) (reviewing
empirical studies of informed consent costs). To be sure, hospitals can find ways around
these hurdles by obtaining (arguably unethical) pro forma authorization and consent without
meaningfully engaging patients, getting waivers of consent requirements from Institutional
Review Boards, using limited datasets with less onerous requirements, or other mechanisms.
But all these avenues have their own costs. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Ruben Amarasingham,
Anand Shah, Bin Xie & Bernard Lo, The Legal and Ethical Concerns that Arise from Using
Complex Predictive Analytics in Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1139, 1141 (2014) (noting
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that is useful for prediction, such as zip code or age (particularly for elderly patients).
Trying to scrub information that isn’t one of HIPAA’s listed identifiers but is
relatively unique or rare can also decrease AI performance.32 It can also make it hard
to reconnect patient records from different parts of a fragmented health system; if
records that track a patient for years are most useful, and the patient moves from
state to state in that time, deidentifying patient records makes it substantially more
difficult to rejoin those records.33 Different methods of deidentification can shift
conclusions drawn from deidentifed data.34 And finally, deidentification itself is
expensive, especially with free-text data such as physician encounter notes.35
To be sure, privacy hurdles are just that—hurdles, not walls. They can be
surmounted. For instance, well-resourced developers may be able to simply buy
partial or deidentified datasets and then use the sort of tactics described above to
reconnect disconnected records, reidentify deidentified records, or infer additional
information from non-health data to health data to obtain a more complete picture.36
Commercial developers are not bound by HIPAA’s rules (unless as business
associates of otherwise covered entities). Once they obtain or create datasets through
whatever workarounds are available, they need not follow HIPAA strictures going
forward.37 And commercial developers are also typically not bound by informed-

that, to comply with HIPAA requirements, the pro forma method is used, and describing the
method as “a highly legalistic form requiring the patient’s signature” while lacking patient
understanding).
32
See, e.g., Xing Song, Lemuel R. Waitman, Yong Hu, Bo Luo, Fengjun Li & Mei Liu,
The Impact of Medical Big Data Anonymization on Early Acute Kidney Injury Risk
Prediction, 2020 AMIA JOINT SUMMITS ON TRANSLATIONAL SCI. PROC. 617, 623 (2020)
(describing the tradeoff between leaving information in datasets used to predict early acute
kidney injury and the performance of those predictors); Charlotte A. Tschider, Deus ex
Machina: Regulating Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence for Patients of the Future, 5
SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 184 n.49 (2018).
33
W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure, 16 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 65, 69–74 (2017).
34
Heng Xu & Nan Zhang, Implications of Data Anonymization on the Statistical
Evidence of Disparity, MGT. SCI. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3662612 [https://perma.cc/4VDU-SGSF].
35
In fact, deidentification is enough of a burden that significant effort has gone into
training AI to, yes, deidentify patient medical records. See generally Stephane M. Meystre,
F. Jeffrey Friedlin, Brett R. South, Shuying Shen & Matthew H. Samore, Automatic Deidentification of Textual Documents in the Electronic Health Record: A Review of Recent
Research, 10 BMC MED. RSCH. METHODOLOGY 70 (2010) (reviewing such efforts); see
supra Section I.A.
36
See, e.g., Price et al., supra note 8, at 448–49; see supra Sections I.A., I.B.
37
Price et al., supra note 8, at 448.
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consent requirements that make data sharing and use costlier, and that do apply to
most academic institutions and other health-care providers.38 These factors can make
commercial data sources comparatively attractive, even for academic researchers.39
B. Privacy Hurdles Bias Dataset Collection and AI Development
The existence of substantial privacy hurdles to health data collection creates the
opportunity for biases in the resulting data and AI trained on them. These
possibilities arise from multiple sources, including the identity of the entities most
able to shoulder the cost of dealing with privacy protections and the processes for
addressing or working around those protections. To be very upfront, these processes
are not the only sources of bias in health data—completely unbiased data collected
equally across the entire system would still reflect biases embedded in the
underlying health-care itself40—but these sources of bias are closely related to the
privacy protections described here.
Consider which hospitals and health systems (collectively, “hospitals”) can
collect and share patient data that can be used to train AI. The process of obtaining
patient authorization and consent is expensive (or sometimes impossible, for prior
patients), as is the process of reliably deidentifying data.41 So is the process of trying
to make sure that the data to be shared are well-formatted, accurate, and reliable.42
And so, unsurprisingly, the hospitals that are most likely to share data for the
development of health AI are a small subset of all hospitals—a subset with
substantial resources.43 Academic medical centers with more substantial resources
are best positioned to gather and collect health data so that it can be used to develop
38
See, e.g., Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Raymond Hutchinson, Erin O’Brien Kaleba &
Sachin Kheterpal, Sharing Health Data and Biospecimens with Industry — A PrincipleDriven, Practical Approach, 382 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 2072, 2072–75 (2020) (describing
the applicable strictures on university data sharing and the University of Michigan’s
approach to sharing patient data with private industry).
39
See, e.g., Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Amanda Fakih, Chris Krenz, Erica E. Marsh & J.
Scott Roberts, Genetic Data Partnerships: Academic Publications with Privately Owned or
Generated Genetic Data, 21 GENETICS MEDICINE 2827, 2827–29 (2019) (finding a
significant increase in academic publications relying on privately held genetic data).
40
See generally DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2015) (discussing racial bias); DONALD A. BARR,
HEALTH DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SOCIAL CLASS, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (3d. ed. 2019) (discussing multiple sources of bias);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Medicine Is Made for Men, N.Y. REV. (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2021/02/11/medicine-is-made-for-men/ [https://perma.
cc/3UH9-FE52] (discussing gender bias and reviewing CAROLINE CRIADO PEREZ, INVISIBLE
WOMEN: DATA BIAS IN A WORLD DESIGNED FOR MEN (2019)).
41
See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 31.
42
W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1401, 1411–15 (2016).
43
W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65,
79–80 (2019) [hereinafter Price, Contextual Bias].
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health AI, in contrast to institutions with fewer resources, such as community health
centers or rural hospitals.44
To take the prime example: undoubtedly, the most important freely accessible
set of health data used to train AI is MIMIC (the “Medical Information Mart for
Intensive Care”), which includes records from ICU patients seen at a single center
in Boston: Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center.45 An enormous number of papers
and conferences have been based on MIMIC data—over 500 in 2019.46 But MIMIC
hasn’t been cheap to create—among other things, Beth Israel Deaconess spends time
and resources to carefully remove all identifiable health information so that the data
are not subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s constraints or informed-consent
requirements.47
But the use of data from a small subset of high-resource settings creates the
chance of biases and limitations in the datasets and resulting AI. MIMIC, after all,
is based on data from just one high-resource hospital in Boston. IBM’s Watson for
Oncology, a much-maligned AI tool aimed at improving cancer care by learning
from experts, was trained on data from the high-resource Memorial Sloan Kettering
Cancer Center in New York.48 When researchers noticed that health AI datasets
“seemed to be coming from the same sorts of places: the Stanfords and UCSFs and
Mass Generals,”49 their follow-up study found that health AI algorithms “were
disproportionately trained on cohorts from California, Massachusetts, and New
York, with little to no representation from the remaining 47 states.”50

44

Id. at 79–90.
Alistair E.W. Johnson, Tom J. Pollard, Lu Shen, Li-wei H. Lehman, Mengling Feng,
Mohammad Ghassemi, Benjamin Moody, Peter Szolovits, Leo Anthony Celi & Roger G.
Mark, MIMIC-III, A Freely Accessible Critical Care Database, 3 SCI. DATA 160035 (2016).
46
Rebecca Robbins, How Patient Records from One Boston Hospital Fueled an
Explosion in AI Research in Medicine, STAT (July 12, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/20
19/07/12/boston-hospital-records-fuel-artificial-intelligence-research/ [https://perma.cc/9P
RK-6E55].
47
Requesting Access, MIMIC, https://mimic.physionet.org/gettingstarted/access/
[https://perma.cc/GP3C-UUHV] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (describing deidentification and
the lack of HIPAA requirements); Robbins, supra note 46 (noting the waiver of IRB
requirements based on deidentification and other factors).
48
Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Recommended ‘Unsafe
and Incorrect’ Cancer Treatments, Internal Documents Show, STAT (July 25, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrecttreatments/ [https://perma.cc/T6LZ-FN44].
49
Rebecca Robbins, Medical AI Systems Are Disproportionately Built with Data from
Just Three States, New Research Finds, STAT (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/09/25/medical-ai-diagnostic-geographic-diversity/
[https://perma.cc/B377-7UBA]
(quoting Amit Kaushal).
50
Amit Kaushal, Russ Altman & Curt Langlotz, Geographic Distribution of US
Cohorts Used to Train Deep Learning Algorithms, 324 JAMA 1212, 1212–13 (2020).
45
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These high-resource contexts are not representative, and the data from them
aren’t either. High-resource contexts see different patients and engage in different
patterns of care than other contexts.51 The data from those contexts reflect only
certain patients and care patterns, and AI trained on those data reflect those patterns
as well—and are correspondingly likely to encounter problems or perform more
poorly when translated into other contexts that look different.52
In addition to which institutions collect data, the process of how those
institutions collect data can create additional biases. Different patient populations
are differently willing to have their data used for future research.53 These differences
are understandable, given the long history of systemic racism and prejudice that
exists within the health system that demonstrates a lack of trustworthiness with
respect to minority patients.54 The causes and solutions to systemic racism in the
health system are beyond the scope of this piece, but the bias in patient consent is
not. Obtaining patient authorization and consent for data sharing can accordingly
bias both the resulting datasets and the AI created based on those datasets.
Deidentification—and avoiding the patient consent process—avoids these issues,
though it may raise its own trustworthiness concerns, and as noted above, it does
create separate challenges for dataset and AI quality.
Finally, the triangulation of health information from non-health data, such as
shopping patterns, fitness trackers, or internet searches, can circumvent privacy
protections but also introduce the possibility for bias. To take a simple example,
Apple products typically have more restrictive privacy protections than Google
products, including Android-powered phones55—and Apple products are often more
expensive, and the user communities are demographically different.56 Data collected
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from smartphones, and the health information that can be inferred (or gleaned
directly) from those data, then, are likely to contain at least some bias. Data from
internet searches, electronic transactions, and fitness trackers may similarly
incorporate bias into resulting datasets and AI trained on them.
To be sure, there are approaches that try to minimize the challenges described
here, some of them technological. For instance, federated machine learning
techniques involve training models on data from many different institutions while
leaving those data in place rather than collecting them.57 Alongside such technical
solutions, an awareness of the problems that can arise from limited datasets can
prompt rethinking both the training applied to those datasets and the rules for
validation that respond to the potential for bias.58 And after training, auditing of AI
can help reveal biases that have become incorporated, whether they arose from
privacy-related workarounds or other sources—though privacy rules may,
unsurprisingly, make after-the-fact auditing itself harder to undertake by limiting
data sharing.59
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
What are we to make of all of this? The current intersection of health privacy
and AI seems deeply problematic: AI weakens protections for health privacy, and
health privacy weakens the AI used in health.
One reaction might be that everything is fine: Privacy is a value worth
protecting, and if there are chinks in the armor, well, that is to be expected. And AI
to improve health is important, but if protecting privacy degrades its capacity
somewhat, well, that’s okay too.
This reaction seems wrong, though; the status quo is hard to defend. In
particular, if health privacy is worth defending, then why limit those defenses to the
narrow set of actors and data covered by HIPAA, as the United States largely does?
HIPAA’s outdated focus on covered entities and its safe harbor for “deidentified”
data leave too much for manipulation, if health privacy protection is the goal.
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The status quo also problematically privileges commercial entities over
academic and nonprofit researchers. As Kayte Spector-Bagdady has pointed out,
academic medical centers in particular face substantially more restrictions than other
collectors of big data or AI developers: They are typically “covered entities” subject
to HIPAA privacy requirements and are also recipients of federal grant funding
subject to informed consent requirements.60 Making research and development
harder for noncommercial entities represents an odd policy position that is difficult
to justify.
Right now, individuals theoretically have some control over their health data
and some privacy protections—but those protections and control are largely illusory
given the many possible avenues of compromise. Rather, privacy protections have
perverse and unequal effects in determining who gets seen by the system and how
data can be used to develop new understanding and improve that system. Tinkering
with HIPAA to smooth out its inequalities and patchiness is a first step, but only a
first step.
More generally, getting privacy right while tapping the power of big data and
AI to improve the health system requires a broader bargain between patients and the
health system. The right approach may be a communitarian one, rather than the
individualistic focus largely dominant today. Giving up some level of individualcentered explicit control over data demands the assurance that those data will be
used to improve the health system and that those improvements will be available for
everyone, not just for a select few. This new bargain will be complex to shape and
implement; academic medical centers attempting to develop responsible learning
health systems are beginning to encounter the challenges involved.61 The
relationship between health privacy and the development of big data and health AI
is dysfunctional now, but the rewards to getting it right are potentially immense.
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